

Labor Outlook*

C. J. Castillo and J. L. Garcia
Labor Research Institute
Labor Education and Research Network

July 2016

1 Introduction

About a year after its inauguration, the Aquino administration launched its economic platform with the Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016 (PDP). The document focuses on improving governance, strengthening macroeconomic fundamentals, infrastructure development, improving competitiveness of industries and sectors, ensuring peace and security, and environmental sustainability. The goal of the PDP is to achieve inclusive growth, that is, rapid, sustainable growth that lifts people from poverty.

Unlike in previous administrations' economic plans, the PDP does not have an explicit chapter on labor. However, the Department of Labor and Employment came up the Philippine Labor and Employment Plan (PLEP) to supplement the PDP. The PLEP follows the decent work framework by the ILO which focuses on four key pillars: productive employment, workers rights, social protection and social dialogue. It identifies two tracks by which, to maintain coherence with the PDP, inclusive growth is achieved. First, the growth-led path puts investments and promotions as priority. In this view, employment creation is an outcome derived from growth resulting from investments in both capital (demand side) and human resource (supply side). The other track is called the employment-led path. It views the labor force as creators of growth and not just as beneficiaries. The employment-led path is deemed appropriate for economies with a large informal sector as it involves extension of services to improve health, knowledge, and skills of the workforce with the expectation that they will eventually be able to penetrate the formal economy and gain productive employment and even participate in various markets as producers. The PLEP sought to combine these two approaches.

Both of these documents are claimed to be products of a consultative process with various sectors of the country. The difference between the plans of the previous

*Draft not for circulation.

administration, especially concerning labor, and the PLEP and PDP is very notable. For instance, the determination of the degree of flexibilization in the labor market, which has become a serious threat to security of workers and bargaining power of unions, was set as a market outcome in the Arroyo administrations MTPDP and that government intervention over the proliferation of flexible working arrangements will be minimal. Meanwhile, in the PLEP, contractualization and precarious work has been identified as a social dialogue issue. This implies that workers are made to participate in discussions with both firms and the government about the extent of flexibility in the labor market. The PLEP has made social dialogue a key mechanism in tackling contentious labor market issues.

The past medium term represents the efficacy of these two plans. The most publicized accomplishment of the previous administration is the economic growth that brought the Philippines into the attention of credit rating agencies. Along with the image of reform, the growth in the past five years trumped those from the previous administrations. The Philippine economy became one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. Growth has created jobs and allowed the continuation of the gradual shift from vulnerable employment into wage and salary work. The economy is expected to maintain remarkable growth rates in the next two years, and the performance of the manufacturing sector will likely be improved especially that the automotive industry roadmap is expected to roll out soon.

But despite these accomplishments, the country is still unable to achieve inclusivity as poverty rates remain unchanged, flexibility being the new typical arrangement for employment, and union density and collective bargaining agreement coverage going the same downward trend all of which we will discuss in detail in the chapters that follow.

There have been serious changes in the configuration of the labor movement due to both episodes of splinters and unity (which has never occurred in the past two decades). The emergence of the labor coalition NAGKAISA was part of trade union renewal. The labor coalition follows a mix of both what Serrano (2013) calls transformative and accommodating logics of renewal because the context warrants it. The transformative logic refers to relatively radical modes of action pursued by unions against direct assault to workers sources of power, or in attempting to create the unions source of power. Mobilizations of unions are primary examples of actions under the transformative logic. Meanwhile, the accommodating logic refers to actions that are done by unions in order to preserve their sources of power. For instance, the Aquino administrations more open engagements with labor is one source of power for the movement. Thus, NAGKAISA engages with the government through the consultative processes and tripartite bodies that have been created.

A growing economy and a growing formal labor market are opportunities for the labor movement to renew itself. However, history has shown that neither of the above resulted in victories for labor since it did not raise wages to decent levels, implemented a policy that favors investors and capital, and has pursued economic

policies made it more difficult to improve unions bargaining powers. The labor movement is still riddled with obstacles that it still has to work out: Trade union density is at an all-time low. Although almost all unions have collective bargaining agreements, the number of the covered workers continuously falls. Union organizing is challenged by the growing incidence of non-regular work while attempts to legislate a law that strengthens security of tenure are shelved. Labor unity has not resulted in more coordination. Womens participation in labor has remained problematic. The labor movement is still broadly fragmented. The issuance of Department Order 40-I-15, which concerns organizing of new unions and the conduct of certification election, by the Department of Labor and Employment created additional opportunity but not without caveat. Unions are currently seen as irrelevant by the very same people that they seek to organize.

This report looks into the state of unions in the context of a growing economy, and the politics and state of the labor movement. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: part II presents the macroeconomic context and the labor market; part III tackles the state of trade unionism; and part IV presents the outlook.

2 Labor and the economy

2.1 Aggregate demand and growth

The economy displayed robust growth in the last medium term, amidst external shocks from the 2008 global financial crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis. The economy showed favorable signs of recovery in 2010 with a remarkable 7.7 percent growth which was understood as sufficient to offset the slump in 2009. However, growth had a brief setback in 2011, slowing to 3.7 percent. The brief slowdown in 2011 was blamed on slower increase in government spending. In the following years, the government implemented policies that would speed up disbursement of funds. For the rest of the period the economy performed remarkably well. In 2012, growth was recorded at 6.8 percent level and 7.2 percent in the succeeding year.

As expected, growth in household consumption spending was stable all throughout the Aquino government at an average of 5.9 percent from 2011 to 2014.¹ In the same span of time, government spending increased by 7.14 percent, with the fastest surge seen in 2012. The brief slowdown in 2011 was blamed on lower government spending and the impact of the EU debt crisis (Lim, 2015). In the following year, the government implemented the Disbursement Acceleration Program that aims to speed up disbursement of funds so as to support growth.² DAP specifically involved the Presidents power to use up savings to augment deficient programs and projects,

¹ Average household consumption spending growth which include figure from 2010 is 5.48 percent.

²DAP was terminated in 2013 following the declaration by the Supreme Court of the unconstitutional nature of some of its provisions.

and the use of unprogrammed funds.³ The effect of this program is evident especially in 2012 as government spending surged to 15.9 percent growth which became instrumental in offsetting a slump in investment and supporting growth.

Investment spending recovered in 2010 with growth of 32.5 percent. In 2012, gross capital formation slowed down by 5.6 percent before making a recovery in the succeeding year with an impressive 31.9 percent. From 2011 to 2015, investments grew by an average of 10.12 percent. Lim (2015) notes that higher investment growth in the past five years compared to that during the Arroyo administration is brought about by the higher level of confidence in the Aquino government and its reformist stance.

Table 1. Annual average growth of aggregate demand, 2010–2015 (2000=100)

Year	Household Spending	Government Spending	Capital Formation	Exports	Imports	GDP
2010	3.3	3.9	32.5	20.7	22.6	7.7
2011	5.6	2.8	5.5	-2.2	-0.2	3.7
2012	6.7	15.9	-5.6	8.6	4.9	6.8
2013	5.7	7.2	31.9	-0.7	5.5	7.2
2014	5.4	-0.3	5.1	11.8	8.7	5.9
2015	6.2	10.1	13.7	5.5	11.8	6.5

Source: Based on data from PSA

The growth felt in the past medium term is described as domestic-led as global demand slumped following the recession in the US and the EU debt crisis (Lim, 2015). Table 2 shows the average share of components of aggregate demand to total output. Household spending make up about 70 percent of the GDP. Government expenditure and investments combined make up about 30 percent of output. On the average, the economy experienced trade deficits brought about by weak exporting sector. Exports had episodes of respectable growth but also periods of contraction. The Aquino administration was met with the exporting sector growing at 20 percent upon its assumption into government in 2010. The following year, however, saw exports falling by 2 percent. On the average, from 2010 to 2015, exports grew by 7.3 percent. However, this is not enough to offset imports which grew by 8.9 percent in the past five years. Lim (2015) notes that a domestic-led growth (as opposed to an export led-growth, one that is observed during the Arroyo administration) is not necessarily bad as demonstrated by growth figures in the last five years.

Table 2. Annual average growth of aggregate demand, 2010–2015 (2000=100)

³A summary of how DAP works is published by the Department of Budget Management through http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?page_id=9769#Caption1.

Period	Household Spending	Government Spending	Capital Formation	Net Exports
1998–2003	72.3	11.5	22.1	-5.6
2004–2009	72.7	9.7	18.7	-1.0
2010–2015	69.7	10.3	20.7	-0.8

Source: Based on data from PSA

2.2 Supply side and growth

2.2.1 Agriculture

Based on average annual growth rates, agricultural output recovered from slump in 2011 but still grew slowly. In 2011, agricultural produce grew by almost 3 percent, a far improvement from contraction in 2010. This growth was sustained in the following year until further slowdown was recorded in the second half of the Aquino government. By 2015, the average annual growth fell to less than 1 percent.

Table 3. Average annual growth by sector, 2010–2015

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Services
2010	-0.41	11.81	7.18
2011	2.99	1.97	4.90
2012	2.75	7.21	7.39
2013	1.07	9.30	6.75
2014	1.42	7.86	5.96
2015	0.23	5.94	6.67

Source: Based on data from PSA

In terms of share to GDP, agricultural contribution gradually fell from 12.5 percent in 2009 to 9.5 percent in 2015. While the average growth from 2010 to 2015 may be positive, declining share is due to industrial sector and services growing faster. As expected, agricultural share to growth rate has also been minimal. The highest contribution of agriculture to growth occurred in 2011, the same year it had the fastest growth.

Table 4. Share of sectors to total output, 2009–2015

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Services
2009	12.5	31.5	56.0
2010	11.6	32.6	55.8
2011	11.5	32.0	56.5
2012	11.1	32.2	56.7
2013	10.5	32.9	56.7
2014	10.0	33.4	56.6
2015	9.5	33.5	57.0

Source: Based on data from PSA

A slumping agricultural sector has been a consistent character of the Philippine economy in the past two decades. Slow growth has been blamed on the country's inherent exposure to natural calamities. Typhoons are the most common form of natural disasters that affect agricultural production. Periods of drought, however, also pose threats to agriculture.⁴ Lim (2016) identify climate change and declining productivity in agriculture as the source for the agriculture slump.

2.2.2 Industry

The manufacturing sector led the economy in terms of growth. Compared with agriculture, manufacturing growth, except in 2011, is considerably decent. Excluding 2010, the highest growth was achieved by the sector in 2013 at 9.3 percent. Manufacturing activities also outperformed both agricultural and services sector in terms of average growth from 2011 to 2015.

Table 5. Contribution to growth by sector, 2010–2015

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Services
2010	-0.3	47.7	52.6
2011	8.2	16.5	75.3
2012	4.8	34.2	61.0
2013	1.7	42.9	55.4
2014	2.7	42.4	54.9
2015	0.4	34.4	65.2

Source: Based on data from PSA

Manufacturing also contributed significantly to GDP growth. Over 2011 to 2015, the industrial sector accounts for 34 percent of GDP growth. Moreover, the share of manufacturing to total output has been increasing steadily from 2010 to 2015. In 2010, 31.5 percent of gross domestic output is attributable to manufacturing activities which grew at 11.8 percent.⁵

2.2.3 Services

The economy remains to be services-based. The services sector continues to provide a stable source of growth for the economy. On the average, services grew relatively slower than manufacturing, but with milder fluctuations.⁶ While the highest growth in services excluding 2010 was 7.39 percent only compared with 9.3 percent in manufacturing, the slowest recorded growth in services between 2011 and 2015 was 4.9 percent and this was when manufacturing grew by only 1.97 percent in 2011.

⁴Using a combination of partial equilibrium simulation and quantitative analysis, Israel and Briones (2012) find that natural calamities do not have significant impact on national agricultural production, however, pose significant negative impact at the province-level agricultural output.

⁵One may expect growth to reach record heights following a slowdown in the previous period. A double-digit growth for manufacturing in 2010 should not be surprising.

⁶With or without considering 2010 growth, manufacturing still grew faster than services on the average.

In terms of contribution to GDP and growth, services lead both industry and agriculture. On the average, services account for 57 percent of the economy's output and 62 percent of the economy's growth over 2011 to 2015.

2.2.4 Poverty

Poverty reduction in the Philippines has remained a serious development challenge. Although there has been significant reduction in the number of poor relative to population since 1991, the outcome of poverty efforts slowed by 2006. In 1991, poverty statistics report that about 34.4 percent of the population was living below the poverty line. This was substantially reduced to 26.6 percent in 2006. There was further decline in the incidence in 2009, albeit by 0.3 percentage point only.⁷ In 2012, poverty incidence was estimated at 25.2 percent of population. By the rate at which poverty declined in the last decade, it became apparent that the development goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015 is unrealistic.

Table 6. Poverty threshold, incidence among population and magnitude, 1991, 2006, 2009

Year	Threshold	Incidence	Magnitude
1991	5,949	34.4	21,749,656
2006	13,357	26.6	22,643,980
2009	16,871	26.3	23,300,444
2012	18,935	25.2	23,745,895

Source: PSA.

Despite falling poverty incidence rate, magnitude of poor population continues to increase.^[8] The rate of increase of the number of poor individuals, however, is diminishing. Poverty figures show that between 1991 and 2006, the magnitude of poor population rose by 4.1 percent. This has been reduced to 2.9 percent in 2006 - 2009 and finally, to 1.9 percent in 2009 - 2012. ADB (2009) notes that in the last decade, economic growth failed to translate into poverty reduction. One reason for this is the inability of the economy to generate quality jobs. Moreover, income inequality also diminishes the effectiveness of poverty reduction programs (ADB, 2009). Inequality is a strong reason why poverty rates in the Philippines remain virtually unchanged despite strong growth in the past five years.⁹

2.3 Labor market

2.3.1 Working age population and the labor force

Between 2010 and 2013, working age population, the number of individuals with ages at least 15 years, increased on the average by 2 percent. The growth of the

⁷Percentage point changes that are so small may be within margins of error, thus, insignificant.

⁹Albert, Dumagan and Martinez (2015) argues that the unchanged poverty rates in the Philippines is due to distributional issues.

working age population is related to the population growth. Notice however that there has been gradual decline in growth rate of the working age population. In 2010, working age population increased by 2.5 percent. By 2013, the growth rate was down to 1.89 percent.

Table 7. Labor market indicators, 2009–2015 (in thousands except rates)¹⁰

Year	Working age population	Labor force	LFPR	Employed	Unemployed	Underemployed
2009	59,237	37,892	64.0	35,061	2,831	6,692
2010	60,717	38,893	64.1	36,035	2,858	6,762
2011	61,882	40,006	64.6	37,192	2,814	7,163
2012	62,985	40,426	64.2	37,600	2,826	7,514
2013	64,173	41,022	63.9	38,118	2,904	7,371
2014 ¹¹	64,033	41,379	64.6	38,651	2,728	7,118
2015	64,939	41,344	63.7	38,742	2,602	7,181

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Labor force measures the number of individuals of working age who are actively participating in the labor market, i.e. either working or seeking employment. The labor force participation rate (LFPR) refers to the number of individuals in the labor force relative to the working age population. Between 2010 and 2013, the labor force has also been increasing albeit at diminishing rate, from 2.64 percent in 2010 to 1.47 percent by 2013. Because the growth rate of labor force was able to keep up with the expansion of the working age population, a flat trend line for LFPR is expected to occur. The LFPR from 2009 to 2013 can be considered flat with small changes. On the average, six in every 10 individuals with ages 15 and above are considered in the market. In the past increases labor force expansion has been caused by the entrance of women into the workforce and this was observed in the Philippines starting in the 70s (Herrin and Pernia, 2003). In 2009–2013, however, LFPR for women somehow reached a plateau. This suggests that a significant number of women are still unable to participate in the labor market and this has important implications on the distribution of income across sex. Notice, however, that in 2015, 0.1 percent of the labor force withdrew from the labor market. In the same year, a 4.6 percent fall in unemployment also occurred despite employment only increasing by 0.2 percent.¹²

Table 8. Labor force participation rate by sex, 2009–2015

¹⁰The Labor Force Surveys after the typhoon Yolanda do not include responses from the Leyte province. See technical notes of Labor Force Surveys.

¹²Labor force contraction can occur due to variety of reasons. During economic downturns, workers may be discouraged from participating in the labor market because of bad employment outlook. It is also possible for labor force to contract when spouses, who were previously employed, decide to withdraw from the labor market perhaps because their spouses is already earning enough for the household. For a developing country with severe shortage of employment in the formal sector and massive poverty, exit from the labor force is unlikely.

Year	Male	Female
2009	78.6	49.4
2010	78.5	49.7
2011	79.0	50.4
2012	78.5	50.0
2013	78.1	49.9
2014	78.6	50.7
2015	77.3	50.1

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Table 8 shows the LFPR for male and female workers. Separate rates for male and female show that males are still more active in the labor market relative to female. More than three-fourths of male of working age are actively participating in the labor market. Meanwhile, only about half of females are in the labor market. This disparity in LFPR still reflects the male dominance in the labor market despite the countrys relatively gender fair labor policies.

2.3.2 Employment, unemployment and underemployment

Between 2010 and 2013, the average employment rate, or the number of employed workers relative to the size of the labor force was recorded at 92.9 percent. This figure shows a slight improvement from an average of 92.5 percent average between 2006 and 2009. The number of employed workers rises slightly faster than the growth rate of the labor force. This caused the improvement in employment rates which have been observed in the last five years.

Table 9. Employment, unemployment and underemployment rates, 2009–2015

Year	Employment	Unemployment	Underemployment
2009	92.5	7.5	19.1
2010	92.7	7.3	18.8
2011	93.0	7.0	19.3
2012	93.0	7.0	20.0
2013	92.9	7.1	19.3
2014	93.4	6.6	18.4
2015	93.7	6.3	18.5

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Stable employment and unemployment figures characterize the bigger picture of the labor market in the last five years. In the context of developing economies, unemployment rate tends to be low (Greenwood, 1999). The reason is that unemployment does not measure the number of workers who are working less hours or even earn less income, which is typical of labor markets in developing countries (Greenwood, 1999). Why this is the case is that labor markets in developing countries commonly have a large informal sector. Own-account workers (especially self-employment) and unpaid family workers are typical in developing countries. Greenwood (1999) also notes that in the presence of high incidence of poverty, the lack of assistance

programs for the unemployed, mainly unemployment insurance, also forces workers who have been separated from previous work to accept any available work.

Table 10. Employment rate and underemployment rate by sex, 2006–2015

Year	Employment rate			Underemployment rate		
	Both	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female
2006–2009 Average	92.5	92.3	92.8	20.3	23.0	16.0
2010	92.7	92.4	93.1	18.8	21.3	14.8
2011	93.0	92.7	93.4	19.3	21.8	15.4
2012	93.0	92.8	93.3	20.0	22.4	16.2
2013	92.9	92.7	93.2	19.3	21.8	15.5
2014	93.4	93.1	93.9	18.4	20.8	14.7
2015	93.7	93.4	94.2	18.5	20.9	14.9

Source: Based on data from PSA.

One typical measure of the quality of work produced by an economy is the underemployment rate. Underemployment refers to the portion of the labor force that is employed but still seeks additional work. Perhaps the most common issue why the underemployed still want more work is inadequate wages. Underemployment in developing countries is considered to be more serious problem than unemployment because the poor cannot be expected not to work especially in the absence of support mechanisms for the unemployed.¹³

2.3.3 Employment by industry

Along with dismal economic performance, the agricultural sector continues to bleed workers. The total share of employment in agricultural activities to total employment continuously falls from 33 percent in 2011 to 29 percent by 2015.

Table 11. Employment share by industry, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Services
2011	33.0	14.9	52.1
2012	32.2	15.3	52.6
2013	31.0	15.6	53.4
2014	30.5	16.0	53.5
2015	29.2	16.2	54.7

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Meanwhile, industries and services have seen increases in shares to employment as these activities absorb surplus labor from the rural sector. A rough comparison between time periods shows that in 2011, industries contributed merely 14.9 percent in total employment and by 2015, this increased to 16.2 percent. The share of services also increased from 52 percent in 2011 to 54.7 percent by 2015.

¹³De Dios argues that the poor are already fully employed (De Dios, 2013). It is not enough to just count jobs generated, but also make sure that those jobs are productive.

This trend will likely continue with an economy on a bull run, the gradual modernization of agricultural activities, the expansion of the manufacturing and services sectors, and until agricultural wages have risen relative to wages in the services and manufacturing.

2.3.4 Employment by class of workers

The share of wage and salary workers to total employment has been increasing. This is another outcome of growth as confidence in the market brings in more demand for labor. In 2010, wage and salary workers compose about 55 percent of total employment. This increased by 3 percentage points in 2013 when its share increased to 58 percent.

Table 12. Employment share by class of workers, 2009–2015

Year	Wage and Salary	Self Employed	Employer	Unpaid Family work
2009	53.3	30.6	4.1	12.0
2010	54.5	30.1	3.9	11.5
2011	55.2	29.6	3.6	11.6
2012	57.2	28.3	3.6	11.0
2013	58.0	28.1	3.1	10.8
2014	58.0	28.1	3.1	10.8
2015	59.3	27.6	3.1	10.0

Source: Based on data from PSA.

The number of wage and salary workers approximates the size of employment in the formal economy. In general, more formality is preferred because of the range of protection available to workers in the formal sector.¹⁴ Moreover, that the informal economy is characterized by decent work deficitsexposure to unsafe working condition, inadequate and precarious earnings, low skill levels, longer working hours, and absence of representation and collective bargainingimplies that a transition from the informal to formal sector should improve welfare (ILC, 2014; 3).

Table 13. Share of employed male and female in vulnerable employment, 2010–2014

Year	Male	Female
2010	44.6	46.9
2011	43.5	46.7
2012	41.2	45.4
2013	40.0	44.2
2014	40.3	44.7

Source: Based on data from PSA.

¹⁴This does not mean however that workers in the informal economy must be disregarded in social protection.

Most employed male and female workers find jobs in wage and salary workers and the size of vulnerable employment has been declining in the past five years. Relative to employment by sex, there are still more female workers in vulnerable employment compared to males. In 2010 for instance, about 47 of 100 employed females were either own-account or unpaid family workers, compared to 45 out 100 male workers who were in the same nature of work. Both ratios have seen decline over time. However, the rate of decline still favors males as more male workers are able to penetrate wage and salary work.

2.3.5 Employment in formal establishments

The size of informality may alternatively be deduced from the size of the employment in formal sector as reported by establishments.¹⁵ Employment reported by establishments is shown in table 14. The distribution of establishment employment also reflects the structure of the economy. Services establishment employ the most in 2009 through 2014. Establishments in industries account for about quarter of the total establishment employment. Agricultural establishments reported employment only account for about 3 percent of total employment.

Table 14. Share of sectors in establishment employment

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Services
2009	3.0	27.7	69.3
2010	2.9	27.7	69.3
2011	2.8	26.3	70.9
2012	3.0	25.6	71.4
2014	2.8	26.2	71.0

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Establishment employment has been growing on an average of 8.4 percent annually since 2009. The reported services employment growth was the fastest among the three sectors with agriculture and industry employment growing annually at 7.4 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively.

Table 15. Establishment employment, 2009–2014

Year	Total	Agriculture	Industry	Services
2009	5,691,110	170,301	1,577,153	3,943,656
2010	5,669,297	166,894	1,571,324	3,931,079
2011	6,345,724	175,547	1,670,710	4,499,467
2012	7,589,591	230,310	1,941,363	5,417,918
2014	7,779,789	219,026	2,036,163	5,524,600

Source: PSA.

Another way to view the formal and informal economy is to look at the size of the employment in micro, small and medium and large enterprises. Establishments

¹⁵Data on workers by class are based on household surveys.

are often classified either according to capitalization or employment. Table 16 gives the employment by classification of establishments. The types of establishment are based on the size of employment. Micro enterprises are those that employ at most 9 workers. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are those that employ at least 10 but not more than 199 workers. Large establishments employ at least 200 workers.

Table 16. Share of establishments by size to total establishment employment

Year	Micro	SMEs	Large
2011	28.0	33.0	39.0
2012	30.5	34.4	35.0
2014	30.1	31.7	38.1

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Based on surveys of businesses in 2011, 2012 and 2014, large enterprises employ about 37.4 percent of employment while micro and SMEs employ about 30 and 33 percent of total employment, respectively. Developing countries are often dominated by micro enterprises. One reason this is the case is that entrepreneurs in developing countries often face capital constraints. Moreover, micro and SMEs often have limited production capacities that prevent them from competing with larger enterprises. The development of the formal economy and the resulting structural change—shift of economic activities from the informal sector to the more productive formal economy—can be achieved with the appropriate set of interventions by the government. Some Asian countries, such as South Korea, achieved development through industrial policies that target SMEs. These experiences from other countries can provide valuable lessons in making industrial policies work for the economy.

2.3.6 Precarious work

The most dramatic feature of labor market trends in the past two decades has been a massive growth of insecurity. This is felt by workers as the fear of job loss is the overwhelming work-related concern of employees today (Hyman, 2004). Contractualization or the increasing number of non-regular workers has become a big issue in contemporary industrial relations in the Philippines. The hiring of non-regular workers as replacement for regular workers is a form of the so-called numerical flexibilization of the workforce that seeks to reduce labor costs borne by companies.

Table 17. Employment in establishments with at least 20 workers, nonregular workers and agency-hired workers, 2003, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014

Year	Employment	Non-regular	Contractor/ Agency-hired
2003	2,602,687	651,219	316,423
2008	3,011,801	731,548	364,610
2010	3,042,750	850,085	341,703
2012	3,769,259	1,148,565	—
2014	4,471,785	1,335,673	621,905

Source: PSA.

Between 2003 and 2014, the number of non-regular workers in establishments employing at least 20 workers more than doubled from 651,219 to 1,335,673 by June 2014. On the average, in 2003, there are 25 out of 100 workers in these establishments that are employed on a non-regular basis. By 2014, this ratio increased to 30 out of 100 workers. In the same period, the number of contractor/agency-hired workers also doubled. Recall that in this same period, DOLE released Department Order No. 18-A which seeks to regulate the hiring of non-regular workers.

One outcome of contractualization is the loss of bargaining power especially of trade unions. Workers under non-regular employment are commonly deemed to be difficult to organize because of the precariousness of their work arrangement. The inability of workers under non-regular working arrangements to bargain for their wages causes downward pressure on wage levels and this adversely affects the bargaining power of trade unions. Edralin (2014) confirms this in a descriptive study among 12 unionized hotels. Edralin (2014) finds that precarious work has weakened unions in terms of reduced membership and resources. Moreover, workers under precarious employment are more exposed to health and safety risks at work and are denied decent pay. These outcomes undermine the principles of decent work and also contribute to inequality and insecurity of workers.

Several attempts to curb the increase in non-regular work have been made by unions. In the last five years, workers' organizations, through the work of some legislators, filed several versions of the security of tenure bill. This bill seeks to abolish exploitative contractual arrangements in establishments. There has been little progress, however, in the legislation of this bill.

2.3.7 Regional minimum wages and productivity

Regional differences in wages has been credited to the wage setting mechanism of the government. Minimum wage setting in the country has been designed to reflect differences in the cost of living across regions and attempt by the government to create jobs across the country. Minimum wages in each region are adjusted independently of each other. Thus, an increase in minimum wages in, say NCR, does not mean that minimum wages in the other regions will also increase. Moreover, minimum wage increases are not necessarily done annually.

Among the three sectors, services have the highest real wages and as expected, agricultural activities posted the lowest real wages. Wage differential across sectors

may be due to the value added by work in economic activities. For instance, work in agricultural activities may not be as productive as work in industries or among formal service establishments, thus driving wages low. The absence of wage setting institutions most especially trade unions in informal employment also causes wages to stagnate.

Table 18. Real average daily basic pay by sector, 2010–2014 (2000=100)

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Services	All
2010	96.82	213.36	300.00	195.24
2011	96.46	216.2	273.55	193.56
2012	98.08	193.21	225.58	196.36
2013	97.34	192.63	230.29	199.52
2014	101.82	188.82	231.95	201.84

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Overall, average real daily basic wage increased by 1 percent in real terms between 2010 and 2014. It is important to note however that real wages in the services and industries fell in the same period. In 2011, average real wage in industrial sectors increased. It however started to decline starting 2012 thus causing a 3 percent reduction over 2011-2014. Meanwhile, real wages in services fell in 2011, and again but this time more sharply at 18 percent in 2012. Although the succeeding years saw increases in average real wages, such increases, which amount only to 2 and 1 percent in 2013 and 2014, respectively, are not enough to offset the wage deterioration in prior years.

Table 19. Growth rates of real wage and productivity by sector, 2011–2014

Year	Agriculture		Industry		Services		All	
	Wage	Prod	Wage	Prod	Wage	Prod	Wage	Prod
2011	-0.4	*	1.3	-0.6	-8.8	1.1	-0.9	0.4
2012	1.7	4.3	-10.6	3.3	-17.5	5.1	1.4	5.5
2013	-0.8	3.3	-0.3	5.7	2.1	3.9	1.6	5.6
2014	4.6	0.2	-2.0	2.7	0.7	1.9	1.2	2.7

*less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Table 19 compares the growth rates in both average real wages and productivity. Overall productivity in 2011 grew slowly at 0.4 percent because GDP in the said year slowed down. Meanwhile, in the same year, real wages fell by 0.9 percent. On the average, real wage trails productivity increase lagging by as much as 2.73 percentage points on average from 2011 to 2014. Standard labor market theory predicts a close relation between productivity and real wages. However, in a setting where the prevailing wage rate is more of an outcome of bargaining than exogenously determined, the gap between increase in real wages and productivity signals loss of bargaining power of workers.

2.3.8 Labor rights and policy

The decline in union strength can be partially attributed to the current labor relations context: the dynamic process of interaction between and among workers (represented by their union), and the employer to achieve their goals (Edralin, 2003). Since the labor relations system is influenced by its economic, social, political, and legal environment, it forms a great part of workers and workers organizations empowerment in terms of their ability to uphold their rights and interests and their opportunities for action.

The labor relations context is in turn affected by government laws and policies. These are then attributed to the concept of human rights assuming that the government is interested in upholding these in the first place. In attempting to analyze the Philippine governments policies on labor relations, it would do us well to start with the concept of human rights as a basis for such an undertaking.

Human rights, whose perceived emancipatory and empowering attributes have drawn equity- and justice-seeking groups to them, making these the main weapons of struggle legal or otherwise (Osaga, 2010). The idea that people have rights bestows upon us entitlements such as protection, equality, development, and self-determination. Labor rights are human rights and these have long been struggled for some being struggled for until today examples of which are the rights to strike, organize/unionize, collectively bargain, employment security, among others.

Most of these rights as, we have already discussed, some rights are still being struggled for have been enshrined in various international covenants. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes the right to decent work and prohibition of forced and child labor (all three of which are enshrined in article 6 but elaborated in article 7, which it describes as just and favourable working conditions), and the right of workers to form or join trade unions as well as the right to strike (both under article 8). While the above-mentioned rights are rights that specifically have to do with labor, if we look at all the rights enshrined in the ICESCR, these pertain to rights that should enable a person to live decently, making these other rights related to how work should be done and what kinds of social protection should be accorded to workers. The Philippines is party to the covenant.

The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), which the Philippines has voted in favor for, also enshrines the following rights: (1) right to work, (2) free choice of employment, (3) just and favorable conditions of work, (4) to protection against unemployment, (5) right to equal pay for equal work, (6) right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring human dignity of the family and herself/himself, (7) social protection, (8) right to form and join trade unions, and (9) right to rest and leisure including limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has also identified Core Labor Standards, which include: (1) freedom of association, (2) right to collective bargain-

ing, (3) prohibition of all forms of forced labor, (4) elimination of the worst forms of child labor, and (5) non-discrimination in employment.

ILO conventions form a great bulk of the legal framework of labor in many countries. According to the ILO websites Information System on International Labour Standards, the Philippines has ratified 8 of 8 Fundamental Conventions, 2 of 4 Governance Conventions, 20 of 177 Technical Conventions. Among those ratified by the Philippines are ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize), No. 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining), and No. 154 (Collective Bargaining).

Yet, even with the existence of labor-friendly laws and recognition on-paper of these rights, this does not necessarily mean empowerment on the part of labor (that is, assuming that these rights are respected). Rights, that come from legislation, must be distinguished from empowerment because rights institutionally recognized opportunities are different from actual empowerment the actual capacitation of actors (Fox, 2005). Thus, while the legal framework forms a large part of the labor relations context, it is necessary to include other factors such as the economic, political, and social/cultural context not to mention the context of globalization in analyzing labor relations (Edralin, 2003).

2.3.9 Trade unions

All over the world, trade unions continuously face threats brought about by globalization. Aganon, et al (2008) citing Katz (1997) argues that the uncertainties brought about by the increasing competition in an increasingly integrated economies forced firms to adjust their operations favoring market and technology strategy over labor-mediated strategy. Market and technology strategy seeks to achieve competitive advantage through technological upgrading and cost-cutting strategies which result in sizeable employment reduction (Aganon, et al, 2008: 13).

Table 20. Union membership in private and public sector and comprehensive union density, 2009–2014

Year	Total	Private sector	Public sector	Comprehensive union density
2010	1,713,590	1,352,910	360,680	8.7
2011	1,778,824	1,375,973	402,851	8.7
2012	1,833,481	1,387,437	446,044	8.5
2013	1,884,432	1,408,162	476,270	8.5
2014	1,944,905	1,426,858	518,047	8.7

Source: Based on data from PSA.

In the Philippines, trade union decline has become more pronounced in the 90s. Firms reaction to increasing competition in the market brought about by the opening of the economy to greater external trade included aversion from having trade unions. The decline in trade unionism is evident in the trends in comprehensive

union density, or the ratio between the number of union members and the size of wage and salary employment. Official statistics show that the union density, computed based on the number of declared membership of unions has declined significantly from 26.2 percent in the 1980s to 8.5 present in 2013.¹⁶ Despite this, union membership has seen continuous increase since 2010 by at least 10 percent. Growing membership and falling union density rate imply that organizing efforts are lagging behind growth in wage and salary employment which has seen rapid increase since 2010.

Union decline is also notable in terms of collective bargaining coverage. Collective bargaining coverage reached a peak in the first half of the 90s with more than 600 thousand workers enjoying the outcomes of collective bargaining agreements. From there, the decline became gradual with some brief periods of increasing coverage. However, the average percent change in collective bargaining coverage from 1993 to 2014 was negative 2.7. In 2009, 17 in every 100 employees in private establishments were covered by CBAs. By 2013, this ratio fell to just 13 in every 100 workers.¹⁷ The results of the Integrated Survey of Labor and Employment of the Philippine Statistics Authority also include report about the state of trade unionism.¹⁸ Data from the ISLE provide an alternative view of the state of trade unionism. In 2003, there are 521 thousand members of unions out of 2.582 million paid employees in establishments with at least 20 employees in non-agricultural establishments. This represents a 20.2 percent union density. Union density fell to 9.9 percent in 2012 and further to 7.7 percent in 2014, but this figure includes agricultural establishments. Excluding the agricultural, forestry and fishing activities, union densities in 2012 and 2014 are 9.3 and 7.4 percent, respectively. Table 22 shows the sectors where union membership grew between 2012 and 2014. Union membership grew in utilities (water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities), transport and storage, information and communication, real estate, administrative and support service activities, education, and arts, entertainment and recreation activities. Except for these activities, union membership fell. Notice that union membership failed to catch up in sectors that experienced the fastest employment growth. Moreover, union membership actually fell in most of these activities. This trend implies the failure of unions to organize growing sectors and the failure of unions to maintain membership.

There is a fair correspondence between establishments with unions and estab-

¹⁶This figure is based on the Bureau of Labor Relations inventory of unions. One problem, however, with data from the inventory of unions is that they may be bloated by unions that have been dissolved but were not reported.

¹⁷CBA coverage figures do not reflect the quality of provisions in CBAs. Ironically, there are some CBAs that only restate the provisions of labor laws. Some CBAs for instance do not go beyond providing just the minimum wage level for workers.

¹⁸In the past, the Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics reported the results of the BLES Integrated Survey. Since 2013, data management has been centralized under the Philippine Statistics Authority. However, the results of BITS and the ISLE may still be comparable for descriptive purposes.

lishments with collective bargaining. In 2003 for instance, 95.6 percent of establishments with unions also have CBAs. In 2014, this ratio was almost maintained, at 94.5 percent. Why there are establishments with unions yet still without CBA may be due to various reasons. For instance, it is possible that during the time of survey, the management and union have not reached an agreement yet (or have not even started bargaining). However, it may be said that in general, most establishments with unions also have CBAs.

Table 21. Union density and CBA coverage based on survey data, 2012 and 2014

Sector	Union density		CBA Coverage	
	2012	2014	2012	2014
Total	9.9	7.7	10.3	8.1
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	23.1	13.3	23.1	14.4
Mining and quarrying	26.8	12.6	26.2	12.9
Manufacturing	13.3	11.7	13.9	12.2
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	33.4	26.8	32.4	36.6
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities	19.2	23.6	18.3	22.5
Construction	1.8	1.0	1.9	1.3
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	6.0	3.1	6.1	3.3
Transport and storage	23.2	20.6	23.2	20.8
Accommodation and food service activities	3.9	2.2	3.9	1.9
Information and communication	10.2	12.7	11.1	12.9
Financial and insurance activities	29.3	16.5	31.5	17
Real estate activities	0.2	1.0	0.4	1.1
Professional, scientific and technical Administrative and support service activities	–	3.0	–	3
Education except public education	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2
Human health and social work activities except public health activities	7.1	5.7	7.7	6.4
Arts, entertainment and recreation	18.1	14.9	19.3	17.3
Repair of computers and personal and household goods, other personal service activities	8.0	14.4	8.1	14.9
	13.3	4.8	13.3	4.8

Source: Based on data from PSA.

Notice that in absolute terms, the number of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements exceeds the number of union members. This should not come as a surprise with the nature of industrial relations in the Philippines where the collective bargaining unit, i.e. the workers represented by the unions, may not be limited only to the union membership. This setup creates incentive spill overs that results

in free riding among those not in the unions but still enjoy collective bargaining benefits.

Table 21. Union density and CBA coverage based on survey data, 2012 and 2014

Sector	Union membership		Union	Employment
	2012	2014	Membership Growth	Growth
Total	371,179	340,371	-8.3	18.7
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	38,977	31,539	-19.1	40.2
Mining and quarrying	8,033	5,066	-36.9	34.2
Manufacturing	122,355	116,862	-4.5	8.9
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	24,022	18,357	-23.6	-4.9
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities	5,542	7,291	31.6	7.3
Construction	3,387	1,850	-45.4	0.8
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	24,944	17,837	-28.5	37.7
Transport and storage	29,501	29,956	1.5	14.5
Accommodation and food service activities	7,826	5,481	-30.0	22.8
Information and communication	11,136	17,152	54.0	24.2
Financial and insurance activities	50,341	43,303	-14.0	52.1
Real estate activities	93	411	341.9	-7.4
Professional, scientific and technical	-	2,841	-	1.9
Administrative and support service activities	2,356	3,987	69.2	19.4
Education except public education	16,619	17,098	2.9	28.3
Human health and social work activities except public health activities	20,217	15,799	-21.9	-5.0
Arts, entertainment and recreation	3,580	4,438	24.0	-30.8
Repair of computers and personal and household goods, other personal service activities	2,248	1,102	-51.0	36.5

Source: Based on data from PSA.

CBA coverage shows a similar downward trend. In 2012, 10 out of 100 workers are covered by CBA. By 2014, this ratio fell to 8 for every 100 workers. Excluding agricultural, forestry and fishing activities, CBA coverage rates in 2012 and 2014 are 9.6 percent and 7.8 percent. The survey results in 2003 show that in non-agricultural establishments about 20 in every 100 employees are covered by CBAs.²⁰

²⁰The reported coverage rate was 19.7 percent.

Clearly, there has been a decline in CBA coverage. This decline is closely tied to organizing deficits of unions and not because some unions take collective bargaining for granted. Both union membership and CBA coverage contraction are outcomes of an increasing market-oriented disposition of firms and aversion from organized labor. Note also that the industrial relations setup of the country contributes to the decline of unions. For instance, the spill over created by the extension of CBAs to non-union members motivates behavior among workers to disengage from union activities because they receive benefits anyway.²¹

2.3.10 Political marginalization

Today's Philippine labor movement traces its origins from such noble organizations that have fought for the Filipino people's sovereignty, rights, privileges, and freedoms that we enjoy today. These organizations have led the nation in social transformation, upholding people's rights and the interests of the common man. Yet, despite being the oldest labor movement in Asia, they remain unable to be a large player in Philippine economic, political, social, and cultural life. And, as we have discussed, the strength of the labor movement has been declining.

The rising economic insecurity of working people in the Philippines has drastically affected the labor movement in that it hinders people's capacities to struggle for their interests. As Smith and Fetner (2010) observes, society's most marginalized people are typically not well placed to engage in what can be highly risky political actions as, lacking economic security, they cannot afford to take many risks. They also tend to lack the time and political skills required to work for social change, not to mention that their political organizations are more likely to lack the resources to engage in extensive political work. Material deprivation leads to denied equal capacity to influence the political processes that help determine how society's resources are used and distributed (Smith and Fetner, 2010).

Aside from the difficulty that working people and their organizations go through in trying to mobilize effectively if they are able to mobilize at all, it is no secret that the virtual allegiance of government institutions and politicians to capitalists' interests drastically dampens the effects of labor's efforts to advance their interests and make their voices heard. To illustrate, in the Philippines, the regional minimum wage setting mechanism supposedly takes into consideration the opinions of organized labor. But even then, this mechanism remains problematic given that a large part of the criteria for setting the minimum wage is the capacity of capitalists to pay or their willingness to invest given the current wage in a certain region. This betrays the voice of labor in minimum wage setting, a basic area of interest for unions.

²¹Workers who are not members of a union but are still covered by CBAs pay an agency fee usually equivalent to the dues imposed on union members.

2.3.11 Women's marginalization in unions

Seeing as unions are organizations that seek to dismantle oppressive structures in order to achieve the liberation of all, it is ironic that unions are also structures of oppression themselves. Membership of trade unions in the Philippines is predominantly male. In 2003, 68.9 percent of union members in non-agricultural establishments are males. In 2006, the share of females in union membership increased by about 3 percentage points from 31.1 percent in 2003 to 34.7 percent. In 2012 and 2014, the shares of female unionists to total union membership were 38.7 percent and 35.6 percent, respectively. Differences in the extent of union membership among males and females emanate from the character of labor markets which are still dominated by males. In the case of the Philippines, the rising share of female unionists in total union membership is not due to unions becoming more open toward females. Note that both male and female union membership figures have been declining, however, male membership falls at a faster rate than female membership. This explains why it appears as if gender imbalance in terms of union membership is gradually improved.

Union leadership, however, is a different case. In terms of union leadership, the share of women in leadership has been declining. According to a 2014 survey done by the Philippine Statistics Authority, of 2,298 union presidents in unions in a myriad of industries, only 14.62% are women. The same dismal proportion of women can be seen on the data on the number of union officers wherein out of the 25,028 total union officers in the same industries, only 20.64% are women.

The share of females in union leadership is more reflective of the level of awareness of trade unionists of gender fairness. Unlike female membership in unions which is more affected by labor market dynamics that are less likely influenced by unions, the involvement of women in leadership posts in union can be influenced more directly by unions through their education programs.

This reflects the depressing bias of unionists towards men when looking for leaders which then affects the degree of representation of women in decisions-making in unions. This unfortunately reinforces the view that women are not fit for leadership, thus making it even harder for women to enter leadership positions or positions of representation in the very unions which are supposed to be an instrument of empowerment of women.

This can also be seen in the how unions handle women-specific CBA (Collective Bargaining Agreement) provisions. In a paper that looked into the trend in working conditions of women workers in selected workplaces with unions, Castillo (2015) showed that (1) unions in general were not able to expand on women's provisions that are already provided by firms, (2) unions in general were not able to push for non-mandatory women workers provisions, and (3) unions in general were only able to secure women workers rights at the minimum as stipulated by law. Assuming that unions are highly gender responsive, unions must constantly secure and expand these rights for women workers through collective bargaining (Castillo, 2015).

2.3.12 Fragmentation of the labor movement

A common slogan and principle in marginalized peoples organizations is that in unity there is strength, making solidarity of prime importance. Ironically though, the Philippine labor movement has yet to unify the different labor centers operating separately, and sometimes even in opposition to each other.

Recently, NAGKAISA, the largest coalition of labor unions and workers organization to date, has since led united May 1 mobilizations, showing an awe-inspiring display sheer massive numbers and support from multiple organizations. This coalition shows that while elusive, labor unity is possible.

Unfortunately, though, the last May 1 mobilization saw NAGKAISA members holding separate rallies, mainly because of disagreements on which electoral candidates to support. While this may not account for disunity (as the members discussed this and, as a compromise, held a united press conference for May 1), this shows how far labor unity has gone at present and how strong other political forces can affect this unity or at least its manifestations. Definitely, much has to be done to nurture NAGKAISA and foster unity among its members.

2.3.13 Aversion toward unions

Capitalists have up till now been using largely sociocultural attacks against unionism, now and then being assisted by media, schools, government, religions, and other institutions as their channels for propaganda, convincing workers and the general public that unions are unnecessary or are obsolete, among other distasteful descriptions.


They have also used the very fruits of unions struggle the minimum wage, salaries, benefits, and other social protection and employment packages as propaganda, claiming these as coming from the generosity of their benevolent employers.

Until recently, they have also added another mode of propaganda to their arsenal. In the firm-level, the current trend of democratization of the workplace, adds responsibilities (read: burden) over the normal roles of workers in the form of lean, decentralized organization wherein they are empowered to make their own decisions on company processes without them actually receiving more of the share of the wealth that they create nor are they given more say in how the firm and their working conditions are managed (Hyman, 2004).

The paradoxical consequence is a form of forced cooperation (Coutrot, 1988 as cited by Hyman, 2004) whereby workers embrace these new tasks due to heightened senses of company-ownership and responsibility; this then creates a false sense of camaraderie that workers may form with capitalists as they are made to feel equal with them, the authenticity of which is, of course, dubious. This also further entrenches the feeling that nothing is wrong with their situations and that they should be happy for being treated as such, thereby making unionism obsolete.

Such an assault to unionism was described by Burawoy (1972) as hegemonic

Figure 1: Projected output, 2016–2017



despotism wherein the managerial assault was carried out not through coercion the rampant condition of most workplaces in the Philippines preceding the 90s, which partly spurred the rise of unionism in the country but through the seemingly collective manufacturing of consent, a somewhat similar idea to Antonio Gramscis concept of cultural hegemony.

3 Marching forward

While it is true that the insurmountable odds that organized labor are facing and the problems both decades old and the new ones that are born from the former has made organizing more difficult, keeping it from achieving its collective agenda, workers and their organizations have remained vigilant, fording the rivers of history that have only strengthened its resolve to pursue the interests of its constituency; for it is exactly in times like these that the need for workers to organize and advance their interests and of society become even more imperative. To this end, it will be

useful for organized labor to look at trends in the economy and take advantage of a projection of the economy.

The economy produced good growth results in the past five years and it will likely maintain the growth momentum in 2016. Figure 1 shows growth projections for 2016 and 2017.²² These growth figures are year-on-year estimates, i.e. growth in say, second quarter in 2016, means that the economy grew by 6.5 percent from the same quarter in 2015.²³ The economy is expected to grow by an average of 6.7 percent in 2016. The lower bound for growth is 5.5 percent while an optimistic scenario gives an upper bound of 7.9 percent growth.²⁴

The economy is expected to still grow in 2017 however, at a slower rate. The average growth for 2017 is 5.9 percent. The fastest the economy could grow is 7 percent while the lowest projected growth for 2017 is 4.9 percent.

A simple way to determine the impact of growth on the labor market, especially employment growth, is to examine employment elasticities. Employment elasticity of demand is easily computed as the ratio between employment growth and output growth:

$$\epsilon = \frac{\frac{\Delta E}{E}}{\frac{\Delta Y}{Y}}$$

where ϵ is employment elasticity. The numerator in the above expression is just the percentage change in employment (either growth or contraction), while the denominator is the GDP growth rate.

Table 23. GDP growth, employment growth and employment elasticity, 2010–2013

Year	GDP growth	Employment growth	Employment elasticity
2010	7.7	2.8	0.36
2011	3.7	3.2	0.88
2012	6.8	1.1	0.16
2013	7.2	1.4	0.19
Average	6.3	2.1	0.40

Source: Authors' estimates based on data from PSA.

Table 23 gives the computed employment elasticities for 2010–2013.²⁵ On the average, a 1 percent growth in domestic output is associated with 0.4 percent increase in employment. This relationship may imply that employment may grow at

²²This is the conservative estimate which refers to the lower hemisphere of actual estimates based on 90 percent confidence interval. The higher bound are actually the mean growth while the lower bound represents the lower bound in actual estimates. The mean growth line (red) represents estimates of average growth.

²³Kinks on the lines are due to seasonal effects.

²⁴The confidence bounds widen because uncertainty increases over time.

²⁵Figures for years 2014 and 2015 were excluded because of differences in annual estimates of employment.

an average of 2.7 percent in 2016 and 2.4 percent in 2017. With a labor force that grows by about 2 percent annually, employment rate can be expected to improve.

The labor movement should take both a growing economy and improving employment rates as opportunities for rebuilding bargaining power of workers. The past five years marked a lost opportunity for the labor movement to grow its base. The labor movement should aim for a reversal of this trend by continuously organizing and taking advantage of social dialogue mechanisms instituted by the previous government to strengthen its bargaining power, at least as a short-term strategy to strengthen the movement in more general terms.

Organizing the unorganized and consolidating the organizations of workers (who will then represent the large bulk of workers) has long been held as the primary means for workers and their organizations to advance their rights and interests in the institutional and cultural level; for in the system we are currently in workers interests only have force when they constitute a united voice, power that is derived from workers associating with other workers. This associational power the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organization of workers (Wright, 2000) has been the forerunning strategy of workers up to this day, the results of which have been the numerous rights and privileges enjoyed by all. But given the developments in global capitalism and its accompanying changes on how work is now arranged in the Philippines, and the current position that labor has in Philippine politics and cultural life, there is a need for the labor movement, its organizations, and its allies to start innovating their strategies specifically, integrated, coordinated collective action among different organizations and a deepening of political and ideological awareness, all of which are based on and must result in unity.

3.1 Labor unity and coordination

Labor unity has remained elusive due to political and ideological differences (though some splits resulted from personal disagreements). Nevertheless, all union organizations agree that it is of primary concern as labor unity has been in the priority agendas of unions ever since. The task then falls upon creating or strengthening alliances that look beyond these differences.

While this is no easy task, labor leaders and their organizations must be able to set aside differences in order to, at the very least, work toward achieving strategic institutional reforms and political power that will strengthen the hold of labor in Philippine politics along with how the economy is arranged specifically working towards industrialization, greater workers control in industry, and workers conditions and their rights to strike and organize.

NAGKAISA, being a prime example of such an alliance, still has to further strengthen trust among its member-labor centers. While it is understandable that this trust-building process will take time, opportunity waits for no one. Thus, NAGKAISA's members must find in itself to take advantage of the opportunities that come from their unity, a unity of such broad proportions that, when coordinated,

may sway the tides of history in favor of Philippine labor. It is time for NAGKAISA to show what they mean when they chant the workers united will never be defeated!

One way of operationalizing said unity and, at the same time, strengthening it is by coordinating the organizing efforts of NAGKAISAs member-labor centers. A potential target for this coordinated, strategic union organizing effort is the organizing of workers organizations in emerging industries to secure union representation in said industries. The Arangkada Philippines project, an advocacy by the Joint Foreign Chambers to increase investment and employment in the Philippines, identified seven sectors that they claim to have high growth and employment potential and in which the Philippines has demonstrated competitive advantage. These sectors are (1) Agribusiness, (2) Business Process Outsourcing, (3) Creative Industries²⁶, (4) Infrastructure, (5) Manufacturing and Logistics, (6) Mining, and (7) Tourism, Medical Travel and Retirement.

Considering the effects of leverage organizing on companies with vast supply chains, one other potential target for coordination is by conducting leverage organizing on said companies, wherein unions in different industries/locations/firms in the supply chain may create coordinated efforts in order to force these companies to yield to union demands. If they so choose to, NAGKAISA can strategically utilize union resources while effectively covering strategic union industries and areas in addition to lessening union raiding among its members.

3.2 Campaigns and lobbying: Policy reform, political power and public perceptions

One other advantage that comes from having a broad coalition of labor centers is that this opens opportunities for labor to more effectively advance policy reforms. Policy reform has a great role in how workers organizations operate as this forms in part the context wherein they choose repertoires of action, aside from the more apparent objective of securing working peoples rights and upholding their interests.

Towards this objective, Fox (2005) sees the sandwich strategy as an effective method for achieving policy reforms. With pressure from above pro-reform policy makers, allies in government, or, as much as possible, our own representatives in policy-making bodies and below grassroots organizations and their social movement organizations the sandwich strategy creates political space and shifts the balance of power between the governing elite and the movement (Fox, 2005). While projecting itself as a policy reform approach, this method as it seems, inadvertently shows that advancing policy reforms as a social movement organization is not so much

²⁶Arangkada defined this as industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill, and talent and which have potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property. Examples of such industries in this cluster are (1) Advertising, (2) Animation, (3) Engineering Design, (4) Financial Services, (5) Architectural and Interior Design, (6) Cultural Exhibition and Performance, (7) Visual Arts, (8) Radio Broadcasting and TV, (9) Motion Pictures, and (10) RD and Consulting Services, among others.

about legal and legislative tactics as it is about political strategy.

As an organization whose members come from and is representing the marginalized sectors of society, NAGKAISA even with its broad membership and allies in congress and the senate has less leverage in legislative bodies, governing institutions, and politicians than do capitalists and their lackeys simply because workers interests are not in their priority agendas while the opposite is true for capitalists and the general elite. Thus, contentious collective action forms the basis of engagement of social movement organizations not because they are rowdy, violent, and extreme but because it is the main and, more often than not, the only option that grassroots organizations have against their more powerful opponents or the powerful elite who hold sway over governing bodies (Tarrow, 2010).

Aside from the well-established practice of conducting an electoral campaign thereby establishing allies of labor within policy making bodies, Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that social protest, in certain circumstances, undeniably have the capability of producing policy change. They argue that by staying mobilized and disruptive, the governing bodies will face electoral instability and will see policy reforms as a route to maintaining order, resulting in more or less favorable policy changes for those protesting. The logic goes that when social unrest produces instability, the governing bodies will almost always respond by ignoring the disruption or by repressing said disruption. But if the disruption is sustained, they will eventually opt for policy concessions coupled with some sort of political inclusion (Piven and Cloward, 1977). While the impact of said concessions may vary, the result is that the protesting bloc gains leverage, gains potential political influence, and is able to show publicly that they are able to influence.

Admittedly, this strategy does not create much policy reform but the point here is to improve union political power. Towards this intention, it is therefore imperative that NAGKAISA is able to show publicly this ability to influence, or in the case of failure to create reform, their concrete actions to create reforms for the public welfare in order to project itself as a bloc for social change in order to shift public opinion in their favor. This may actually result in more than just potential political power for unions; this may also result in the shift of public perception on unions and unionism with potential effects on union density and public approval of unionism, thus expanding the choice of repertoire due to the opened opportunities of public approval.

3.3 Collective bargaining for collective power

Going into the local union level, there have been concerns about how union members and even union leaders view collective bargaining.

While it is true that collective bargaining through unions is the main recourse of workers to uplift their individual conditions, it is important to remember that unions political power matters more as this is what provides them with the authority to conduct collective bargaining on behalf of the workers of a firm in the first place.

More importantly, collective bargaining gives workers and their unions the resources, and the political and cultural space to expand and consolidate their unions, educate and mobilize members on issues and campaigns, and to help union members expand their political horizons beyond the firm and to the societal level to take upon them the task of establishing social justice.

In order to do this, education on collective bargaining (e.g., the preparatory seminars/trainings for collective bargaining) needs to reflect this view of collective bargaining. Here, collective bargaining becomes an extension of ideological and political education, framing it as a tool for workers liberation, for their struggle for control of their lives as a collective, and of power. Emphasis must then be given to the concept of bargaining power, the nature of the relationship that workers have with capitalists, and that collective bargaining is a collective endeavor.

3.4 Organizing of contractuels

With the current trend of greater and greater degrees of precarious work and labor flexibility, labors organization must not only oppose contractualization, but also organize the contractuels as either part of the main unions or as workers associations that work hand-in-hand with unions.

While it is understandable that the reason for the aversion from organizing contractuels is that they are more susceptible to managements anti-union maneuvers, they are not left with any means with which they may voice out their concerns if they are not made part of the union or are organized into workers associations. Contractuels cannot let unions do the work for them: they must be part of the struggle; they must embrace the struggle as their own.

If the strategy of contractuels engagement with companies is not favorable for a certain context, then their level of engagement can be elevated to national governing institutions wherein they can fight alongside regular employees in campaigning against precarious work. This is especially timely since President Duterte has, time and again, announced that he is against contractualization.

The sheer numbers of contractual workers can definitely paralyze any company if they strike, and if this is the exact same argument that labor uses when showing the power of [regular] employees, then why cant this be used by contractuels in order to struggle for their right to security of tenure?

It is true that the problem posed to unions by contractualization is a complex one. Unfortunately, if President Duterte and his administration does not follow-through with their pronouncements, it is safe (or rather, unsafe) to say that the number of contractuels will continue to grow. It is then all the more essential that unions are able to prepare for this situation and strategically engage this issue by finding ways in organizing contractuels if our current organizing strategies will not suffice.

3.5 Workers Cooperatives: Models of workers control and ownership

Unionism and Cooperativism — while contrary to public opinion, even those of unionists and cooperative intellectuals—are intimately related and, at least in the authors opinion, inseparable. The ties of unions and cooperatives go way back to when workers simultaneously fought for their rights and interests while creating mutual, usually economic, support organizations, some even cultivating their own enterprises where they collectively own the means of production, democratically manage the enterprise, and democratically distribute the product of their work among their members who is to say that workers cannot embark on such an undertaking now?

In fact, there are multiple workers cooperatives that have been established in the past few years, some even decades old and new ones are being established today, whether it be new start-up enterprises or companies that have been bought-out by workers and were converted into workers cooperative enterprises. These workers cooperatives have thrived and are growing, examples of which are New Era Windows, (a worker-owned and -managed factory), Union Cab (a worker-owned and -managed taxi company), Collective Copies (a worker-owned and -managed print shop), multiple worker-owned and -managed factories in Argentina that were closed down due to the economic collapse of 2001, Suma (a worker-owned and -managed cooperative that distributes vegetarian, fairly traded, organic, ethical, and natural products) and the Mondragon Corporation, a transnational cooperative constituted by smaller cooperatives based in Spain, that even has its own university to train and educate their workers, often held as the example of the potential of what cooperatives can become (although the present authors find its use of labor-service only cooperatives, at the very least, disagreeable).

By advocating for and with the cooperative movement, the labor movement is proposing an alternative economic system from the decadent capitalist one: a system wherein workers control and own the means of production.

While full of potential, the idea of workers cooperatives has already been subverted in the capitalist system with the emergence of labor-service only contracting firms masquerading as workers cooperatives wherein the workers in these cooperatives not only arent part of the cooperative itself, but are also subjected to precarious work. Instead of being the basis for economic democracy, these cooperatives have become another cog in the capitalist system, trapping workers back to the same cycle of precariousness.

In the Philippines, there is not much data on workers cooperatives, and this lack of documentation makes workers cooperatives a vague concept in the Philippine context, especially as to how these are operated, governed, and are established in a way that can be sustainable.

If unions and cooperatives aim for economic democracy, they must be able to establish an alternative supply and value chain wherein the firms in such a supply

chain are cooperatives themselves. While there has been much research work on social solidarity economies, the concept is still under development. Initially, social solidarity economy refers to a value chain of goods and services by organizations and enterprises (examples of which are cooperatives and other forms of social enterprise, self-help groups, community-based organizations, associations of informal economy workers, service-provisioning NGOs) that are pursuing economic and social aims while fostering solidarity. They are guided by the principles of cooperation, solidarity, ethics, and democratic self-management (International Training Centre of the International Labour Organization, 2011). Perhaps unions and cooperatives in the Philippines might be able to help with that by establishing Philippine models and documenting actual practice.

It is clear that there is much work to be done in order to see to it that cooperatives truly become part if not the basis of an alternative future to the capitalist system, both economically and politically. Therefore, workers and their organizations must take the initiative of working on and with cooperatives for the long-term vision of economic and political democracy, and the mid-term strategic actions of upholding the rights and interests of workers and their allies in other marginalized sectors.

3.6 Collective bargaining for informal workers

Admittedly, there remains a very uneasy rift between formal and informal labor. This is quite ironic because both are composed of the same members: workers. Yes, the difference lies in the conditions and context of work, and while these may be significant differences, we must remember that their interests are essentially the same: decent work for all.

This, of course, does not mean that we must treat them the same. As was stated before, each has their own contexts, and therefore the strategies employed for both must be nuanced to their situations. The same can then be said for collective bargaining, a hereto unheard of strategy for organizing in the informal sector.

3.7 Resource mobilization in workers' organizations

A key aspect of the work of workers organizations is the mobilization of union funds. Admittedly, resources accumulation and mobilization has been a bane in social movement organization management as its members are, more often than not, unable to dispense large amounts of their time and money, not being part of the more affluent echelons of society. Nevertheless, social movement organizations are still able to operate, being able to conduct education, research, and organizing work. But there must be ways to make resource mobilization and collection more efficient. It is no secret that dues collection is problematic in union work. With more efficient dues collection, unions can more effectively carry out programs and projects and ensure that workers organizations are sustained.

Another way of maximizing union work is by delegating organizing and other similar tasks to committed local union members in organizing or education committees in order to free up time and resources for federations staff to do federation and national support work. It is about time that unions are able to produce organic organizers, much like Gramscis concept of the organic intellectual. Organic Intellectuals are, in a nutshell, intellectuals borne of the movement as opposed to traditional intellectuals external to the movement who came into the movement. The organic intellectual articulated the collective consciousness of their class in the political, social, and economic sphere. This then meant that organic intellectuals must be able to draw out and make coherent the aspirations and potentials inherent in working-class activity. Thus, organic intellectuals relationship with their class was dialectical: they drew upon working-class experience and then imparted this to the working-class movement as theory (McLellan, 1998). Molding this definition into the concept of organic organizers, this simply means organizers who are not external to those being organized. They are organizers from, for, and by the organized.

Local union organizing committees made up of organic organizers can then try and organize at least one union in their industry every 1 or 2 years and consolidate their own unions so that organizing work is not given to federation staff in order for them to be able to attend to federation work, examples of which is coordinating with other federations in conducting federation-level organizing or coordinating the organizing and education work of local unions in the federation and other related work.

3.8 Feminist unionism

Unions, as much as other self-proclaimed democratic organizations, must see to it that they battle patriarchy. Unions can help by first battling the macho culture that has run rampant in most workers organizations.

But this does not mean that all will be calm and orderly: as with all liberation movements, there will be friction from opposition, even ironically so in unions! This simply means that women unionists must be able to engage their male counterparts and help them understand the need for a feminist unionism if the movement truly desires to be liberative.

Fortunately for women unionists, they have allies in like-minded men unionists who will be able to support them. But remember that all they can ever be are supporters: it is up to women unionists to champion the cause of feminism as its standard bearers, to ensure that they empower more women and educate more men to end patriarchy!

In line with the above, unions can support the creation of a feminist union culture by establishing womens committees in all levels of organization and to make sure that there are women in all union committees. While this may seem quite a shallow intervention, this has long-term effects in womens empowerment. But this must be supported by efforts to empower women to take on more responsibilities in order

to help battle the centuries-old patriarchy-based disempowerment that still affects womens perceptions on leadership today.

In the same vein, unions can combat patriarchy by also creating LGBT committees or integrated gender committees in order to empower members of the LGBT sector as well. A somewhat new sector for unions to include in their advocacies, LGBT empowerment must not be left behind.

In terms of legal rights through CBAs and specific union work, Castillo (2015) in his paper on women workers working conditions recommended that unions engage in education activities for women to ensure that women workers are informed about their rights are able to assert these rights in the workplace. Castillo also urged unions to negotiate women-specific CBA provisions such as menstrual leave, lactation spaces and feeding schemes, and to go beyond stipulations of the law in negotiating for benefits concerning health and leave benefits both for pregnant women and their spouses.

On a last note, while GAD (Gender and Development) frameworks and feminism seeks the liberation of not just women and LGBTs, but also of men from patriarchy, gender work must be oriented to be biased towards women and LGBTs. Failure to do so will lets us fall into the trap of not emphasizing enough the victimization of women and LGBTs because of patriarchy, which is sadly a trend in many so called gender and development champions. Blindness to the centuries of discrimination, marginalization, and violence that women and LGBTs have undergone and are still currently exposed to, albeit in much less explicit ways helps no one but the status quo.

Much has been achieved regarding womens and LGBTs liberation but the victories are still small when compared to the enormous task laid upon the movement today. But through affirmation of feminism, unions can become structures of liberation and empowerment instead of structures of continued oppression.

3.9 Ideological and political education of union members: Developing a class consciousness

Underscoring all of the above is the need to deepen the ideological and political orientation of union members and, ironically, some of the union leaders themselves.

Without an understanding of the basic ideological and political premises of the workers movement, it is doubtful whether unions will ever transcend the logic of what Marx has called the trade union consciousness or what we call the orientation of bread and butter unionism, which has been the by-product of unions inability to comprehend much less fight for an alternative future for the arrangement of economic, political, and cultural life beyond the capitalist ideological premise, a premise that puts capital and its accumulation over peoples lives and freedom.

A conceptualized working class consciousness has remained elusive among the ranks of workers, and understandably so as the capitalist ideology has had deep reaches in todays society, having rooted what Gramsci calls a cultural hegemony

wherein peoples lives revolve around the logic of capitalism: a logic that governs how people think, what is possible and impossible, and how life should be lived.

While there are existing union education programs that have sought to propagate a working class consciousness, having underwent trainings of these kinds has remained confined to a select few unionists as most workers find it hard to embrace such a concept, much less enjoin other workers in adopting it as a kind of counter-hegemony to the capitalist one.

Another issue arises in the education strategy for the attainment of an ideological and political orientation. Most unions education programs are ladderized, with formal ideological and political education seminars placed at the top. The assumption for this approach to union education of course is that workers will need to have exposure in union work in order to deeply understand the ideological and political underpinnings of the workers movement and the struggle against capitalism. But this ladderized program makes ideological and political education harder to reach for the normal union member to actually attend such trainings, confining the reach of such education seminars to few unionists, most of which are union leaders. A suggested action may be to embed ideological and political awareness in all the trainings of unionists in order to introduce the concept in the more widely attended trainings (e.g., collective bargaining trainings, basic orientation seminars, and the like) while enjoining workers to make time for an ideological and political orientation seminar, the real task of course would be to show how important this kind of seminar is to union work.

While education work is not confined to programmatic trainings and seminars, as education work can actually be done in the informal discussion which forms the groundwork for organizing unions and workers, seminars and trainings formalize learning and is a space for discussion among unionists, making these a breeding ground for further understanding.

Thus, much rethinking must be done to package this concept, and the education programs themselves, to more effectively propagate this consciousness. Workers and their organizations must find time and allot resources to re-conceptualize the trainings for ideological and political awareness in order to make it more enticing for workers to actually see the need for such trainings.

Another form of ideological and political education is by exposing unionists to more forms of struggle, letting them see actual union work. This can then make them more interested in what is done in the labor movement and what motivates labor to do what it does.

In the final analysis, without an ideological and political framing of labor movement work, unions will revert to bread and butter unionism, never transcending from concentrating on narrow, short-sighted goals, and the chances for systemic social transformation will remain forever slim, if not impossible.

3.10 On social movement unionism: Labor's role in social transformation

Overarching all that has been discussed is the significant role of unity among workers and their organizations for the achievement of their rights and collective interests.

But beyond the unity of workers, it is equally essential to work with different marginalized peoples organizations in fighting for social justice and democracy. This comes from the understanding that labor is but one marginalized sector and that its liberation will be dependent on the liberation of all, and the liberation of all shall be formed in part by the liberation of labor. This kind of unity work with other marginalized sectors groups entails the use of the framework of Social Movement Unionism (SMU).

While it is not the goal of the present authors to give a very detailed discussion on SMU, it will be beneficial to this discussion to give a short description of the concept. SMU unites trade unions and the labor movement with other social movements to strengthen their position against an entity or an issue that they are targeting in order to advance mutually beneficial goals (Aganon, Serrano, and Certeza, 2009). In other words, SMU is about labors solidarity among their allies from other marginalized groups in order to bring about broader social, political, economic, and cultural transformation in society. More often than not, this entails the formation of broader forms of organization, usually coalitions or alliances, and sometimes even political parties.

This then requires workers to have a deeper understanding of their issues and the interconnectedness of their issues with those of other marginalized sectors thus necessitating the need to unite in the struggle against the likewise interconnected roots of the problems of present-day society: modern-day feudalism, capitalism, patriarchy, climate change, and neo-colonialism characterized by imperialism.

It is high-time that labor unites within its ranks and among other marginalized sectors. We must not let our rallying cry, "*Uring Manggagawa, Hukbong Mapagpalaya,*" go in vain.

References

- Aganon, M., Serrano, M., & Certeza, R. (2009). *Union revitalization and social movement unionism in the philippines: A handbook*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Aganon, M., Serrano, M., Mercado, R., & Certeza, R. (2008). *Revitalizing Philippine unions: Prospects and constraints to social movement unionism*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and UP School of Labor and Industrial Relations.
- Arangkada. (n.d.). Arangkada philippines: A business perspective. Available at: <http://www.investphilippines.info/arangkada/report/>. (Accessed: 12 July 2016)

- Burawoy, M. (1979). *Manufacturing consent: Changes in the labor process under monopoly capitalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Castillo, C. J. (2015). *A model for dynamic collective bargaining provisions on women's working conditions* (Tech. Rep.). Manila: Labor Education and Research Network.
- De Dios, E. (2013). Don't add underemployment to unemployment. *Per Se*. Available at: <http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/perse/?p=3072>. (Accessed: 30 June 2016)
- Edralin, D. (2003). *Collective bargaining in the Philippines*. Manila: National Book Store.
- Edralin, D. (2014). Precarious work undermines decent work: The unionized hotel workers' experience. *DLSU Business and Economics Review*(24.1(2014)).
- Fox, J. (n.d.). Empowerment and institutional change: Mapping virtuous circles of state-society interaction. In R. Alsop (Ed.), *Power, rights, and poverty: Concepts and connections*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Greenwood, A. (1999). International definitions and prospects of underemployment statistics. International Labour Organization. (Paper prepared for the Seminario sobre Subempleo organized by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas (DANE) and the Universidad Javeriana, Bogot, Colombia, 8 to 12 November 1999.)
- Herrin, A., & Pernia, E. (2003). Population, human resources and employment. In A. Balisacan & H. Hill (Eds.), *The Philippine economy: Development, policies and challenges*. Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Hyman, R. (1999). An emerging agenda for trade unions? Labour and Society Program, International Institute of Labour Studies. (Available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/gurn/00170.pdf>. Retrieved on 16 March 2016.)
- Israel, D., & Briones, R. (2012). Impacts of natural disasters on agriculture, food security and natural resources and environment in the philippines. *PIDS Discussion Paper*(2012-36).
- Lim, J. (2016). An assessment of the economic performance of the administration of Benigno S. Aquino III. Action for Economic Reforms.
- McLellan, D. (1998). *Marxism after Marx: An introduction* (3rd ed.). London: MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Osaga, E. (2010). Social movements and rights claims: the case of action groups in the niger delta. In L. Thompson & C. Tapscott (Eds.), *Citizenship and social movements: Perspectives from the global south*. New York, USA: Zed Books.
- Piven, F., & Cloward, R. (1977). *Poor people's movements: Why they succeed, how they fail*. New York: Vintage Books.
- International Labour Conference. (2014). Transitioning from the informal to the formal economy. Geneva, Switzerland: International Labour Office.
- International Training Centre of the International Labour Organization. (2011). Social and solidarity economy: Our common road towards decent work. Reader

- for the ILO Academy on Social and Solidarity Academy 2011. (Available at http://www.ilo.org/empent/units/cooperatives/WCMS_166301/lang-en/index.htm. Retrieved 3 July 2016.)
- Serrano, M. (2014). Between accommodation and transformation: The two logics of union renewal. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 1 - 17.
- Smith, J., & Fetner, T. (2010). *Structural approaches in the sociology of social movements* (B. Klandermans & C. Roggband, Eds.). New York, USA: Springer Science + Business Media.
- Wright, E. (2000). Working-class power, capitalist-class interest, and class compromise. *American Journal of Sociology*(105(4)), 957-1002.

Data sources

Philippine Statistics Authority.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.